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Ham, Mozart, & Limits to 
Freedom of Expression
Frictions in Europe
A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O  
&  F R A N K  P E T E R
In September 2006 a distressed French 
high school teacher Robert Redeker 
wrote, in a leading newspaper, a viru-
lent article about the “Islamic Threat” 
to the “Free World” (presumably Eu-
rope and North America). There the 
author maintained that Muhammad 
was a “merciless war lord, a plunderer, 
Jew-massacrer, and polygamous man,” 
and the Quran a book of “unparalleled 
violence” insidiously shaping the mindset of all Muslims.1 
The anxiety
The invective led to the swift prohibition of the newspaper in Tuni-
sia and Egypt and attracted immediate criticism on Al-Jazira. The un-
fortunate French teacher later received death threats, forcing him to 
quit his job and change domicile. The unoriginal link postulated by 
the author between Islam and violence thus seemed to constitute a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In the following debate, the newspaper editors 
condemned—as they should have—the threats, and justified publish-
ing the article on grounds that it contributed to “an in-depth under-
standing of current realities.” The initial shock on hearing about the 
threats was followed by collective outrage, and passions ran high in 
the Republic. A cartoon, appeared in Le Monde, perhaps best expressed 
the angst of large sections of French society: in a depressing and som-
bre modern city populated by menacing women covered in black, a 
white Frenchman gesticulates anxiously to a friend about to eat a sand-
wich: “What? Ham? Are you crazy or what?” (See image, published in Le 
Monde, dated 5 October 2006). 
Pork may not be quite as important to contemporary (white) French 
identity as the cartoon suggests, but the feeling of ever diminishing 
freedoms in order to pre-empt Muslim anger cer-
tainly is. Although this particular example was set 
in France, debates across Europe increasingly share 
the psychological and emotional anxiety underlying 
the Redeker affair—an anxiety linked to the social 
uncertainty brought about by those globalization 
trends which have left culture as the last remaining 
domain wherein “fantasies of purity, authenticity, 
borders, and security can be enacted.”2
The holistic threat
Voices across the continent—of politicians, in-
tellectuals, artists, and Churchmen—are rising to 
demand an urgent reconsideration of Europe’s 
position regarding Islam and Muslims. They refer 
to a series of recent events which have been 
widely interpreted as evidence of a fundamental 
and holistic threat posed by Muslims to European 
freedoms—including the violence unleashed by 
the publication of the Danish cartoons, the protests 
against Pope Benedict XVI’s lecture in Regensburg 
last year, and the Berlin cancellation (contempora-
neous to the French affair) of a staging of Mozart’s 
Idomeneo in September. Together these events are 
glossed under the topical issues of freedom of ex-
pression, possibilities of criticism of Islam, and self-
censorship, contributing largely, as the formula goes, to the social, and 
therefore very real, construction of a clash of civilizations. 
The aforementioned events are important and the threats posed to 
the well-being and life of those targeted cannot be tolerated under 
any circumstance. This makes it all the more necessary to think about 
the nature of this threat. Looking at the 
writings of those who call our attention 
to this threat, one finds that it is less 
its precise origin (a speculation about 
possible Muslim reactions; a tiny group 
of cyber jihadists; a handful of Mus-
lim activists) than its scope which are 
emphasized, leading some observers 
to compare the present situation with 
that of the 1930s when appeasement 
policies paved the way for a global tragedy. 
The appeasement analogy needs to be recognized as a discursive 
stratagem that participates in the construction of a global and decon-
textualized Islamic threat. It gives added resonance to those calls for 
showing “strength” and “resisting”3—the kind of emotional language 
and politics of fear that are mobilized today in order to defend the leg-
acy of the “Enlightenment.” Whenever conflicts do erupt, they seem to 
take on a heightened symbolism or, to put it differently, an “excessive 
religiosity.”4 This is unhelpful, as it ultimately serves only to delegitimize 
those voices which point to the mostly local and circumscribed char-
acter of conflicts about Islam in Europe, as well as to the sheer variety 
of Islamic ways of life—a variety which escapes easy categorization or 
predictions on future developments. 
Block thinking
The recent cancellation of Hans Neuenfels’s production of Idome-
neo—a staging of a Mozart opera which controversially included a 
display of the decapitated heads of Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, and 
Poseidon—provides an instructive case. The controversy was sparked 
by an act of miscommunication between the security agencies, Berlin 
authorities, and the Opera’s director. The fact that the Deutsche Oper 
grossly “misunderstood” the security threat was 
symptomatically dismissed in the following de-
bates, with commentators focusing instead on 
the act of “self-censorship” to which it supposedly 
led. Clearly, however, both the causes of the affair 
and the course of the ensuing discussion were the 
result of “block-thinking”: fusing “a varied reality 
into a single indissoluble unity,”5 the perception 
of German Muslims is now primarily determined 
by terrorist violence occurring outside of Ger-
many. The possibility that Muslims in Germany 
might blow up a public building in reaction to 
a perceived insult to the Prophet Muhammad 
suddenly acquired great political significance, 
notwithstanding its unprecedented and, accord-
ing to German security agencies, rather unlikely 
nature. 
There is an urgent need to debate why this type 
of unwarranted assumptions about European 
Muslims has become so widespread. Block think-
ing is seriously putting at risk the capacity to dis-
cern differences inside Muslim communities and, 
ultimately, to speak and engage with Muslims. 
It is rendering the political management of reli-
gious diversity in Europe a mere rhetorical device: 
one cannot seriously claim to work for the “inte-
gration” of Muslims or expect to engage in meaningful dialogue when 
one’s basic view on Islam is so laden; it would be more accurate to 
speak of a process of forceful assimilation as the sole policy aim. Once 
one starts reasoning with reference to entities as broad and vague as 
“Islam” or “Europe,” one disconnects from the world one lives in.
Focusing on two recent controversies—the 
cancellation of Mozart’s Idomeneo in Berlin and 
the death threats against a French teacher for 
criticizing Islam—this article revisits the flawed 
construction of a clash between Islam and 
freedom of expression, and seeks to show how 
the debates are connected to a problematic 
vision of Europe which necessarily excludes 
Muslims. 
Whenever conflicts 
do erupt, they 
seem to take on 
a heightened 
symbolism or, to put 
it differently, an 
“excessive 
religiosity.”
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Frictions in Europe
Both the French and German examples mentioned here 
highlight a number of structural features of debates 
about Islam in/and Europe. They include a distortion of 
the social and political realities of Europe, an unashamed 
anti-intellectualism that seeks to stifle debate, and a 
problematic vision of the place of Muslims in the Old 
Continent. 
When the Deutsche Oper reversed its decision and 
decided to stage Idomeneo in December, the event was 
conspicuously attended by Germany’s elite. Although 
they had opposed the cancellation of the opera, rep-
resentatives of two of the main Muslim federations in 
Germany (Islamrat and Zentralrat der Muslime) did not 
attend the performance, but neither did several leaders 
of Christian churches as to do so would—in the words 
of the president of Germany’s Central Council of Catho-
lics—express a “lack of self-esteem,” rather than an act of 
tolerance.6 While this view may not be shared by all Ger-
man Christians, it demonstrates that these debates are 
largely internal to Europe. They point less to an Islamic 
threat than to the often unacknowledged but neverthe-
less constant need to renegotiate secular and political ar-
rangements in democratic contexts. 
The attempt to construe, as matter of principle, Muslim 
dissent illegitimate was particularly clear in the French 
case. There, in a high-profile petition “in favour” of Re-
deker, a number of prominent intellectuals made sur-
reptitious links between the death threats and various 
other forms of Muslim protest against “provocations” to 
what were simply characterized as “foreign sensitivities.”7 
The mobilization of deceptive self-evidences (such as the 
myth of an absolute right to free speech, when in practice it is regu-
lated by a multitude of social, legal, and political considerations) is re-
quired in order to project a vision where Muslims as such can only be 
foreign and external to Europe.
While Muslims in both countries condemned the death threats and 
criticized the cancellation of the opera due to security concerns, the 
media construction of these debates as civilizational clashes necessarily 
marginalizes these voices—independently of their actual media pres-
ence, which, more often than not, is limited. Setting the terms of the 
debates in this way evacuates in turn any question about the function-
ing of media institutions and their role in the dissemination of Islamo-
phobia (for example through the publication of Redeker’s diatribe) and 
allows intellectuals to discursively enact the exclusion of Muslims from 
Europe in guise of “defending the continent.” The politics of intolerance 
that is articulated here works through the current deadlock of integra-
tion policies, where an increasing gap has opened up between social 
and political visions bent on promoting illiberal attitudes and actions 
(concerning the headscarf, transnational marriages, even the use of 
foreign languages) in the name of a culturally homogenous nation-
state on one hand, and the legal and constitutional order, which often 
obstructs these projects, on the other. 
Brushing over differences in the policies of incorporation of Islam in 
Europe—policies that, incidentally, can hardly be described as “soft”—
these writers misleadingly depict past approaches towards Islam in Eu-
rope as the result of “cowardice” or lacking political determination. The 
caricature of Islam, which is so central to these writings, is thus paired 
by an equally distorted presentation of Europe’s modes of engagement 
with Islam and European Muslims in the past decades. While this type 
of binary thinking is insufficient for understanding positions towards 
Islam, it is a necessary means for establishing as proper intellectuals a 
group of writers whose media fortune both enables and is enabled by 
the current orientation of policies towards Islam in Europe. 
Such intellectuals typically construct a world where criticism of Islam 
becomes an act of heroism—as if these are lone voices railing against 
the odds.8 Such claims are surprising, not least because today in Eu-
rope on the topic of Islam and Muslims one can precisely say almost 
everything—and, more often than not, turn it to one’s advantage. In 
France, Claude Imbert, a prominent intellectual and member of the 
very official Haut conseil à l’intégration, recently declared himself to be 
“a little islamophobe” since “Islam, not Islamism, carries a certain debil-
ity”—a sentiment he perhaps not incorrectly asserted to be shared by 
many of his contemporaries. The fact that his intellectual reputation 
was left untarnished speaks eloquently of the banalization of Islamo-
phobia in France. Elsewhere, the case of the late Oriana Fallaci—whose 
pamphlets became bestsellers in French, German, and other European 
languages—is only the most notorious case of what has become a pro-
liferating literary genre.9 The content of such books is sometimes so 
excessive as to render the call for reasonable debate ludicrous; their 
success—as gauged for example by market sales, prizes, and other in-
tellectual distinctions—rendering hollow ideas of a European “political 
correctness” in the face of Islam. Given the ubiquity of radical critics 
of Islam in media and public debates—and the regular exclusion of 
alternative voices of experts, not to mention those of Muslims them-
selves—one should inquire instead about the ways through which Is-
lamophobic discourses contribute, along with the death threats, the 
libel cases, as well as the assaults on Muslim persons and institutions, 
to a vicious circle of violence not-always-symbol-
ic, thus partly producing the hostility which they 
seek to denounce. 
It seems more fruitful in this context to reflect 
about what the constant reference to self-inflict-
ed restrictions tells us about the power distribu-
tion between Muslims and other Europeans. It 
is of course ironic that only those who have free 
access to public media bother to engage in long 
debates on “self-censorship.” What is most prob-
lematic here is not the inequality itself, but the 
fact that it has effectively led to a situation where 
debates on Islam all too often turn into a mono-
logue and any real or imagined demand by Mus-
lims is automatically considered a threat or an act 
of censorship. Whether interaction in the public 
sphere should function along these lines or can 
be understood in such terms is a question which 
begs an urgent answer.
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